In welfare we trust? Political trust in Portugal and Spain, 2008-2014 by Sanches,  Edalina et al.
In welfare we trust? 
Political trust






270 citizenship in crisis
introduction
In representative democracies political trust is often featured as a key 
requirement of regime stability and legitimacy, as well as quality of democracy, 
translating the popular support that the democratic system enjoys (Easton 
1975; Newton and Norris 1999; Norris 1999). Moreover, political trust has 
an impact in terms of electoral turnout and vote choice (mainstream vs. 
third-party vote), other modalities of political participation (distrust erodes 
institutionalized and fosters de-institutionalized forms of participation), 
or support for public policies targeting social outgroups (Kaase 1999; 
Hetherington 1999; Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Bélanger and Nadeau 
2005; Hooghe and Marien 2013). Trust in political institutions is, therefore, a 
building block of political citizenship in contemporary democracies.
For that reason, the fact that several public opinion surveys pointed to a 
downward trend in trust in political institutions in Western democracies since 
the 1980s (Kaase 1999; Newton and Norris 1999; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; van 
der Meer 2010; Belchior 2015) has raised concerns. Representative institutions, 
in particular governments, parliaments, and political parties, are those earning 
less trust amongst citizens, while implementing institutions (e. g. police, courts) 
seem to fare better (Kaase 1999; Newton and Norris 1999; Marien 2011). This 
decline is more pronounced in the United States than in Europe (Marien 2011). 
Within Europe, Southern countries have recently known sharp downturns 
in terms of political trust (Torcal 2014; Belchior 2015; Muro and Vidal 2017; 
Fernandes et al. forthcoming). Portugal and Spain are no exception in the wider 
Southern European context, although the trust debacle seems to have been 
steeper in the latter than in the former (Fernandes et al. forthcoming).
Unsurprisingly, in the Iberian Peninsula these falling trends gained visibility 
as the economic and financial crisis became more severe. While previous 
studies pointed out the relevance of the general economic or government 
performance as key factors of political (dis)trust in these countries (Teixeira and 
Freire 2010; Torcal 2014; Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior 2014), less attention 
has been paid to the role of perceptions regarding the impact of the economic 
crisis beyond unemployment rates or poverty risks: namely the way the 
welfare state, an important staple in these recent democracies, actually works. 
A notable exception to this is the work by Fernandes et al. (forthcoming), who 
revealed that at the macro-level there was, surprisingly, a negative  relationship 
between social protection spending and trust in representative institutions in 
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Southern Europe between 2000 and 2015. A positive relationship between 
the citizens’ welfare state experiences and political trust (that is, at the micro-
level) has been observed elsewhere, however (Kumlin 2002; Kumlin and 
Haugsgjerd 2017).
This chapter analyses the relationship between welfare state performance 
(namely in the lesser-studied subfields of health and education) and trust in 
political institutions in Portugal and Spain at three key moments: before the 
financial crisis (2008), during its peak (2012), and after the end of the foreign 
aid programmes (2014): a full-fledged bailout in the case of Portugal (2011-
2014) and the injection of funds in Spanish banks (2012). Both countries are 
new democracies, with slightly different institutional profiles (Bruneau et al. 
2001) and party systems with similar degrees of stability, registering an increase 
in volatility only in the post-2008 period (Sanches 2017). Nevertheless, these 
countries have been affected unequally by the recent Eurozone crisis (Bellucci, 
Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012; Magalhães 2014): while Portugal experienced 
the most acute crisis and had to be rescued by the Troika, Spain also saw a 
worsening of several macroeconomic indicators such as government debt and 
the unemployment rate, but the external intervention was of a considerably 
milder nature: cash flows to Spanish banks in peril. The context of the post-
2008 financial and economic crisis in these countries is an interesting one 
to test hypotheses about the factors that influence political trust, since the 
turmoil was of greater volume than any other pattern of negative economic 
performance experienced by most European democracies in the last decades. 
From this broad depiction, what interests us the most is how perceptions of 
welfare performance may have had different impacts on levels of political trust 
in Portugal and Spain, before, during, and after the peak of the sovereign debt 
crisis, and for citizens with different levels of cognitive mobilization.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we review the literature 
on the factors underlying political trust in democratic societies, with a special 
focus on studies carried out in Portugal and Spain and on those that attempted 
to find a causal link between welfare and trust in representative institutions 
(Guillén, Álvarez, and Silva 2003). Then, recent welfare state  developments and 
citizens’ perceptions of welfare performance in both countries are discussed. The 
following section presents the goals, hypotheses, and data used in this chapter. 
The fourth section is devoted to the discussion of the results of several regression 
models computed with the aim of testing our hypotheses. The chapter ends with 
the summary and discussion of the main empirical patterns observed.
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trust in political institutions: an overview
Trust in political institutions is a recurring theme in the political science 
research agenda. This includes studies looking at political trust as an 
explanatory factor of political attitudes and behaviours such as satisfaction 
with democracy and political participation (Almond and Verba, 1963; Kaase 
1999; Inglehart 1999; Zmerli and Newton 2008), but also those contributions 
seeking to identify the cultural, economic, and policy factors of political trust, 
at either the micro or macro-level (Newton and Norris 1999; Mishler and 
Rose 2001; Hooghe, Marien and Oser 2017; Zmerli and van Der Meer 2017). 
This second research stream, to which the present chapter contributes, can be 
divided into two main schools of thought: cultural and institutional.
Cultural theories suggest that political trust is exogenous, that it is 
generated outside the political sphere. Within this account political trust is 
perceived as “an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and, 
much later, projected onto political institutions” (Mishler and Rose 2001, 31). 
In other words, it is determined by the level of social trust that individuals 
develop throughout life, resulting from their socialization in specific cultural 
norms. Almond and Verba (1963) were the first to theorize this relationship by 
postulating that social trust was an important component of the democratic 
civic culture. Later, Putnam et al. (1983) and Putnam, Leonardi and Nonetti 
(1993) argued that citizens’ integration in social networks produced forms 
of social capital and of mutual trust that helped to increase the effectiveness 
and vitality of democratic political institutions. A few recent empirical studies 
have, indeed, observed such a relationship: there are significant correlations 
between social and institutional trust at the macro-level and, when important 
controls are included in the analysis, the relationship between social and 
political trust is also observed at the individual level (Zmerli and  Newton 
2008; Newton and Zmerli 2011).
Alternatively, institutional theories argue that trust is endogenous, a result 
of the evaluations people make of the performance of political institutions 
(Mishler and Rose 2001; van der Meer and Zmerli 2017). Institutional theories 
contend that the quality and the performance of institutions is what best 
predicts trust, thus suggesting that trust is quite instrumental: “Institutions that 
perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism 
and distrust” (Mishler and Rose 2001, 31). This explanatory account anticipates 
short-term changes in trust levels as a result of shifts in economic growth or 
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perceptions of corruption. Many empirical studies have tested the effect of 
institutional performance, either alone or in conjunction with cultural variables. 
Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) found that at the macro-level, unemployment and 
governmental instability are negatively correlated with trust in government and 
in parliament. Newton and Norris (1999) have shown that neither social trust 
nor associativism are key factors of individual trust in political institutions; in 
fact, the performance of governments and political institutions are the strongest 
explanations for the decline of political trust observed in western democracies 
between the 1980s and the 1990s. Focusing on the Central and Eastern 
European post-communist countries, Mishler and Rose (2001) also concluded 
that the origins of political trust lie mainly in institutional explanations, being 
largely determined by the countries’ political and economic performance. 
Lühiste (2006) developed a similar study for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
noting that the performance of political institutions (perceptions about the 
economy, corruption, and evolution of civil rights) explains the confidence in 
political institutions better than cultural variables.
The recent wave of studies aiming at explaining the erosion of trust in 
political institutions in Southern Europe, namely in Portugal and Spain, have 
pointed out the relevance of the institutional factors, but also of cultural factors 
and political attitudes. Teixeira and Freire (2010), for instance, analysing the 
determinants of trust in parliaments in Portugal, Spain, and Italy, found that the 
greater the interest in politics and the trust in other institutions, the greater the 
confidence in parliaments. Interestingly enough, Portugal was the only country 
in which economy and government performance variables were statistically 
significant, and Spain the only one in which social trust has a significant effect. 
This does not mean that these are opposite cases, but instead that there are 
within-country specificities that need to be taken into consideration. Torcal 
(2014) also studied the determinants of trust in political institutions in Spain 
and Portugal during the crisis, using as main independent variables assessments 
of the economy and responsiveness (that is, the extent to which political elites 
care about what people think). One of the most significant results is that policy 
responsiveness is the most important and robust predictor of trust, suggesting 
that the fact that citizens think political elites do not care about their opinion 
is what most negatively affects trust in political institutions. His study also 
finds a significant effect of economic assessments, especially sociotropic 
assessments, in the levels of trust in representative institutions. Analysing the 
cases of Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain, Muro and Vidal (2017) tested the 
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effects of the quality of institutional outputs, observing that levels of public 
debt, unemployment, and perceptions of corruption were the main predictors 
of political trust, while inflation, gdp, and government effectiveness had no 
significant consistent effects, unlike the gini index, which also emerges as a 
significant predictor. Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2014) observed that 
short-term factors (evaluations of the government performance, the economy, 
and the main parties during the crisis) were those with larger and more regular 
effects on trust in parliaments in Portugal and Greece between 2008 and 2012. 
More recently, in a macro-level study of trust in national political institutions, 
Fernandes et al. (forthcoming) noted that higher levels of trust in representative 
political institutions were correlated with lower rates of unemployment and 
poverty risk in Southern Europe.
Within the institutional framework, studies focusing on the relationship 
between welfare state performance and trust in political institutions are, as 
we noted above, less common (Kumlin 2002; Kumlin and Haugsgjerd 2017; 
Fernandes et al. forthcoming). Our knowledge on the effects of welfare 
performance on political trust lags behind what we know about the effects of 
interpersonal trust, and short-term economic and government performance. 
However, citizens’ personal experiences with different kinds of welfare 
institutions can play an important role in generating trust (Kumlin 2002), 
because citizens will make inferences about the functioning of the political 
system and the conduct of public officials on the basis of their experiences 
with these institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).
welfare state in portugal and spain:
recent evolution and citizen perceptions
The creation of welfare systems in Portugal and Spain dates back to the second 
half of the 1970s with the dismantling of the authoritarian regimes and the 
transition to democracy. The new democratic constitutions sanctioned the 
citizens’ right to social protection, such as access to public education and 
health systems (Ferrera 2000; Silva 2013). European integration has activated 
a set of reforms aimed at modernizing and improving the social protection 
systems (Ferrera 2005; Petmesidou and Guillén 2014). Although several 
indicators point to an improvement of the social protection system, some 
dysfunctionalities persist  in the two countries (Alves 2015; Silva 2013).
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The outbreak of the crisis in 2008 and the following recession and its social 
and economic effects have put the welfare systems of Southern European 
countries under stress. Structural reforms of the welfare systems and cuts in 
social protection were carried out during the crisis, and key sectors such as 
pensions, workers’ protection, healthcare, and education were targeted by 
austerity measures ( Gutiérrez 2014; Pereirinha and Murteira 2016; Villota and 
Vásquez- Cupeiro 2016), causing investment in these areas to obtain smaller 
proportions of governmental spending vis-à-vis previous periods. Indeed, 
if we consider public health expenditure as a percentage of the government 
expenditure, the data show a decrease of 2.8 percentage points in Portugal 
and 1.2 percentage points in Spain between 2008 and 2014 (Table 11.1). At the 
system level the measures undertaken meant a shift of the costs of healthcare 
increasing for patients, with potential negative effects in terms of access and 
inclusion (Petmesidou, Pavolini and Guillén 2014). Public investment in the 
educational system has fallen as well, but not at the same time in the Iberian 
countries. In 2009 Portugal came close to the European average in terms of 
government expenditure in education, but it quickly regressed to lower levels 
in 2010; in Spain, a visible governmental disinvestment is apparent only from 
2012 on (Table 11.1).
To what extent has this set of developments had an impact on the way the 
Portuguese and Spanish assess the performance of their welfare states, namely 
in terms of the quality of healthcare and public education? In both countries 
citizens show throughout this period low, moderate, to  negative, levels of 
Public expenditure on health and education: trends in Portugal and Spain 
(2008-2014)
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satisfaction with the performance of their welfare systems (see Table 11.2). 
The European Social Survey data for 2008-2014 shows that the panorama in 
Portugal is of relative stability, while in Spain there is a continuous decrease in 
the perceptions of welfare performance. This trend may be surprising if one 
considers that, grosso modo, cuts were not significantly harsher in Spain than 
in Portugal, and could be explained by the fact that the decrease in public 
investment in these sectors may have been directed to more visible aspects 
of the health and education systems in Spain than in Portugal, or may have 
received more negative media coverage. Also, the fact that Portugal had to 
implement harsher austerity measures under the troika programme targeting 
several other areas of the welfare system might have polarized the media and 
the public debate around other topics (wage freeze, cut in pensions, massive 
emigration), leading to the same feeble impact on citizen perceptions of how 
the healthcare and education systems were performing.
goals, hypotheses, and data
This chapter has two main goals at its core: to test the effects of welfare 
performance perceptions on political trust and to examine whether there are 
differences in the effects of welfare performance on political trust in Portugal 
and Spain at different moments of the sovereign debt crisis, as well as for 
citizens with different levels of cognitive mobilization.
Four main hypotheses will be tested. First, in line with the institutional 
theories and inspired by the work of Kumlin (2002) and  Kumlin and 
Haugsgjerd (2017), we expect that trust in political institutions will be greater 
amongst the citizens who assess the performance of the welfare state in a more 
positive manner (hypothesis 1). Assessments of the welfare state performance 
and levels of trust in political institutions that ultimately decide how much and 
how to manage the welfare system are different and fairly independent features. 
While trust can be seen as an affective orientation toward the political system, 
welfare assessments express an evaluative orientation concerning specific 
political/institutional objects (Almond and Verba 1963). Even though trust 
may have, in specific circumstances and for a number of citizens, a biasing 
impact on satisfaction with welfare performance, we expect the former to be 
a consequence of the latter. In other words, citizens will trust as a result of an 
instrumental evaluation of how well institutions perform, based on the quality 
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of the outputs. Thus, how citizens assess the performance of key sectors of 
the welfare state (specifically health and education) is likely to generate trust 
or otherwise distrust in the political institutions that are responsible for 
implementing welfare policies.
In addition, we expect that welfare performance perceptions will have a 
stronger role after the advent of the sovereign debt crisis (hypothesis 2). This 
expectation is based on the assumption that the context of crisis may have 
polarized these perceptions and given them a stronger political meaning.
We also test the assumption that during the crisis years, the impact of 
welfare assessments is less in Portugal (in which welfare cuts could be seen 
as exogenous) than in Spain (in which they did not stem from a bailout 
programme). In the first case, the welfare cuts were associated with the 
bailout, while in the latter a formal bailout never occurred; therefore, it 
makes sense that the national political institutions in Spain would suffer 
more in terms of their trustworthiness due to negative assessments of 
the welfare state performance. On the contrary, in  Portugal the crisis was 
initially seen as “imported” and the incumbent party was not strongly 
punished for it at the polls in 2009 (Freire and Santana Pereira 2012), and 
the need for austerity measures was strongly linked with the three-year 
foreign aid programme. Corroborating this depiction, it has been shown 
that Portugal has the lowest share (even if still majoritarian) of citizens 
holding the government accountable for the crisis when compared to the 
other Southern European countries (Lobo and Lewis-Beck 2012). Therefore, 
national political institutions may have been comparatively less blamed for 
the quality of welfare services in Portugal than in Spain. In short, during 
the peak of the crisis, the impact of welfare performance perceptions on 
the levels of trust in political institutions will be stronger in Spain than in 
Portugal (hypothesis 3).
Lastly, we examine the extent to which the effects of welfare performance on 
trust are significantly shaped by the way citizens process political information. 
The theory of cognitive mobilization suggests that those who are better 
educated and those who have more access to information will have more 
supportive attitudes toward the political system (Inglehart 1970, 1977), but 
also rely less on short-term cues to assess the degree of trustworthiness political 
institutions are entitled to. If that is the case, we should expect satisfaction 
with welfare performance to be less important for those with higher levels of 
cognitive mobilization. In other words, citizens with higher levels of cognitive 
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mobilization will display weaker links between their perceptions of the welfare 
performance and trust in political institutions (hypothesis 4).
Our analysis draws on data from three rounds of the European Social 
Survey (ess) conducted at the onset (2008), the peak (2012), and the aftermath 
(2014) of the crisis in Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is an index 
of political trust that varies between 0 (no trust at all) and 10 (complete trust). 
It reports citizens’ levels of trust toward three representative institutions/
actors: political parties, national parliament, and politicians. The decision to 
collapse citizens’ ratings into an index follows conventional conceptualizations 
that treat representative political institutions as a cluster (Marien 2011) and 
is furthermore supported by both factor and reliability analysis that reveal a 
unidimensional structure of trust in our data.1 As Figure 11.1 demonstrates, 
levels of confidence in political institutions are particularly low not only in 
 Portugal and Spain, but across the sample of cases included in the ess. Still, 
there are some differences that merit highlighting. First, citizens of the two 
Southern European countries (Portugal in particular) display much lower 
levels of political trust when compared to most European countries. From 
a longitudinal perspective, however, levels of trust exhibit a more dramatic 
fall among the Spanish than the Portuguese. Second, levels of trust follow a 
downward trend during the crisis and recover a little in 2014.
To explain these differences, our main independent variable is welfare 
performance, which is measured as an index2 that aggregates citizens’ 
appraisals of the state of education and of health services using a scale on 
which 0 means “extremely bad” and 10 “extremely good”.3 This variable enters 
the models alone and interacted with an index of cognitive mobilization that 
considers citizens’ levels of media exposure and interest in politics. The index 
ranges between 0 (when there is no interest in politics and no time at all 
devoted to watching/listening/reading news about politics and current affairs 
programmes) and 4 (when the highest level of interest in politics and exposure 
to information on politics is reached).
1 Both analyses were performed for each country and year considered. All factor analyses produced a 
one-component solution that explained at least 70% of the total variance. The Cronbach Alfas are good, 
running from 0.861 (Spain 2008) to 0.890 (Portugal 2012).
2 Cronbach Alfas are acceptable, running from 0.570 (Portugal 2008) to 0.765 (Spain 2014).
3 Unfortunately the survey does not include questions on the performance of social security or 
pension systems, which is why we focus on education and health systems.
political trust in portugal and spain (2008-2014) 279
Additionally, we have considered a set of controls that come across as 
relevant predictors within the main theories of trust. Following the cultural 
approach discussed above (Mishler and Rose 2001), interpersonal trust was 
included in the analysis, with the expectation that it will bear positively on 
political trust. Interpersonal trust is measured by the question “generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?”, with answers being confined to a scale on 
which 0 means “you can’t be too careful” and 10 means that “most people can 
be trusted”. Also, based on the institutional approach (Mishler and Rose 2001), 
we use satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with the government 
as a way to control for the effect of institutional performance on matters 
unrelated to welfare on trust. Both variables are measured similarly, through 
a scale running from 0 “extremely dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely satisfied”.4
We also added a variable measuring the level of agreement with the sentence 
“The government should take measures to reduce differences in income 
levels” (original scale was recoded so that 1 means “disagree strongly” and 
5 “agree strongly”). Finally, socio-demographic variables were also included: 
4 Question: On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy/government in 
[country]?
Trust in political institutions in Portugal and Spain (2008, 2012, 2014)
  
Question: Using this card, please tell me on a scale of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I 
read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [Parliament, political 
parties, and politicians]
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age (in years), gender (0 = female; 1 = male), education (in years), household 
income (runs from the lowest – 1st decile – to the highest income level – 10th 
decile), working status (1 = if respondent had a paid job in the last seven days; 
0 = if otherwise), and radicalism, which is measured as the distance between 
citizens’ placement in the left-right scale (where 0 means “left” and 10 means 
“right”) and the centre point of the scale.
A total of six regression models were estimated for each country. That is, for 
each of the years considered (2008, 2012, and 2014) we estimated one model 
that comprises all independent and control variables and a second model 
that adds the interaction term between welfare performance and cognitive 
mobilization.
Descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables, presented 
in Table 11.2, allow us to make an initial characterization of Portugal and 
Spain across the three time points considered. Regarding satisfaction with 
Summary statistics on independent and control variables 
portugal spain 
 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014
average values Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Welfare performance 4.2 1.8 4.3 2.0 4.5 2.1 5.7 1.8 4.9 2.2 4.5 2.2
Cognitive mobilization 2.5 0.7 2.8 0.8 2.8 0.9 2.5 0.7 2.7 0.9 2.8 0.9
Interpersonal trust 3.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 3.7 2.5 5.0 2.0 5.1 2.1 4.9 2.1
Satisfaction with
the economy 
2.9 1.9 2.2 1.9 3.0 2.1 3.6 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.9 2.2
Satisfaction with the
government 
3.3 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.5 4.1 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.4
Reducing differences
in income levels
4.2 0.7 4.4 0.7 4.3 0.8 4.0 0.9 4.1 0.9 4.3 0.9
Age 46.6 19.4 48.3 19.0 49.1 19.4 46.0 18.7 46.9 18.1 47.9 18.5
Years of education 8.0 4.7 8.7 5.0 9.1 5.0 11.6 5.3 12.9 6.0 13.1 5.9
Income 4.6 1.8 3.8 2.0 5.0 2.7 5.1 2.6 4.7 2.9 5.0 2.7
Radicalism 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.5
percentages             
Gender (male) 47.8 46.8 47.0 48.9 48.9 48.8
Occupation (paid work) 47.9 42.9 45.1 55.3 44.3 46.7
Table 11.2
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welfare performance, differences across time are small at the aggregate level, 
but the standard deviations (sd) suggest some variation around the average. 
Still there are differences between countries, for while in Portugal the trend of 
satisfaction is relatively flat, in Spain it is downward, thus suggesting greater 
convergence between perceived and actual welfare performance among the 
Spanish (see Table 11.2). In terms of cognitive mobilization, citizens have 
become more interested in politics and exposed to it over the years in both 
countries, and levels of interpersonal trust stayed more or less the same – 
even though much greater in Spain than in Portugal. Furthermore, it is in 
Portugal that more people agree that “the government should take measures 
to reduce differences in income levels”, particularly during the crisis. As for the 
other control variables, the Spanish have more years of education and higher 
income levels than the Portuguese, while levels of radicalism are very low in 
both countries (in Portugal polarization increased slightly after the crisis and 
in Spain at the peak of the crisis).
results
Starting with the first set of regressions, presented in Tables 11.3 and 11.4, 
the results give support to hypothesis 1. Across the models estimated, 
citizens’ satisfaction with welfare performance is positively and significantly 
correlated with political trust (the exception is  Portugal 2012). The 
moderating variable – cognitive mobilization – also reaches significant 
effects, with higher levels of cognitive mobilization engendering higher levels 
of political trust. Regarding the main control variables, interpersonal trust 
is a significant predictor of political trust, thus supporting the culturalist 
perspective that trust is embedded in norms and values that citizens acquire 
outside the political sphere and throughout the socialization process. 
Additionally, the conventional explanation that trust is a matter of how well 
institutions perform is also corroborated: the greater the satisfaction with 
the economy and the government’s record, the higher the level of popular 
trust in political institutions. The other variables considered in the model 
show little or no effect at all on political trust.
For a clear idea of the effects of welfare performance on political trust, 
adjusted predictions are presented in Figures 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4. This gives us 
the predicted value of trust as welfare performance goes from being evaluated 
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Determinants of political trust in Portugal: the effect of welfare performance 
assessment
 2008 2012 2014
Welfare performance 0.20(0.03)*** 0.04(0.03) 0.18(0.03)***
Cognitive mobilization 0.34(0.08)*** 0.16(0.06)** 0.44(0.07)***
Interpersonal trust 0.07(0.02)** 0.11(0.02)*** 0.07(0.02)**
Satisfaction with the economy 0.34(0.03)*** 0.44(0.03)*** 0.32(0.03)***
Satisfaction with the government 0.02(0.01)** 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.01)*
Reducing differences in income levels -0.06(0.07) -0.07(0.07) -0.11(0.07)
Age 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Gender (male) -0.07(0.10) -0.23(0.10)* -0.27(0.12)*
Years of education 0.01(0.02) 0.00(0.01) 0.05(0.02)**
Income 0.14(0.03)*** 0.09(0.03)** -0.02(0.03)
Occupation (Paid work) -0.14(0.13) -0.13(0.12) -0.25(0.13)+
Radicalism 0.07(0.05) -0.02(0.04) 0.05(0.03)
_cons -0.57(0.46) -0.05(0.44) -0.38(0.46)
Number of observations 933 972 983
R-squared 0.32 0.29 0.31
Adj R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.30
Note: significant at +p<0.1*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 11.3
as “extremely bad” (0) to “extremely good” (10), while all other variables 
are centred at their mean. Taking one year at a time, in 2008 (at the start 
of the economic crisis) the average value of trust when welfare performance 
is considered bad (0) is of 1.9 in  Portugal and 2.3 in Spain (Figure 11.2). 
However, when the highest level of satisfaction with welfare performance is 
reached (10) the average value of political trust is 5 in Spain and 3.9 in Portugal. 
The effect of welfare performance on political trust then falls substantially in 
2012, in both countries, and especially in Portugal, where the effect is not 
significant (as the flat line, and larger cis, of Figure 11.3 show). In Spain the 
average political trust is of 1.5 at the lowest levels of satisfaction with welfare 
performance and reaches 3 at the highest levels of satisfaction. In  Portugal 
levels of trust move from 1.9 to 2.2 from the lowest to the highest point of the 
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Determinants of political trust in Spain: the effect of welfare performance 
assessment
 2008 2012 2014
Welfare performance 0.27(0.03)*** 0.17(0.02)*** 0.23(0.02)***
Cognitive mobilization 0.43(0.07)*** 0.26(0.05)*** 0.22(0.06)***
Interpersonal trust 0.19(0.02)*** 0.12(0.02)*** 0.14(0.02)***
Satisfaction with the economy 0.33(0.02)*** 0.39(0.02)*** 0.31(0.02)***
Satisfaction with the government 0.00(0.00) 0.02(0.01)** 0.02(0.01)**
Reducing differences in income levels -0.01(0.05) -0.12(0.05)* -0.09(0.05)+
Age 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Gender (male) -0.24(0.09** -0.19(0.09)* 0.04(0.10)
Years of education 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.02(0.01)
Income 0.03(0.02)+ 0.01(0.02) -0.03(0.02)
Occupation (Paid work) 0.05(0.11) -0.18(0.10)+ -0.40(0.11)***
Radicalism 0.11(0.03)** 0.06(0.03)* 0.01(0.03)
_cons -1.06(0.37)** -0.16(0.34) 0.06(0.39)
Number of observations 1534 1452 1382
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.31
Adj R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.30
Note: significant at +p<0.1*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 11.4
welfare  performance satisfaction scale (thus confirming no effect of the latter 
at all). In 2014, levels of trust are more similar between the two countries. In 
fact, at the worst evaluation of welfare performance the predicted value of 
trust is 1.7 in both countries. Trust then increases across the scale, reaching 
3.9 in Spain and 3.5 in Portugal at the highest point of satisfaction with welfare 
performance (Figure 11.4).
Overall the results show that the levels of political trust in Spain are much 
more affected by evaluations on welfare performance than in Portugal, thereby 
confirming Hypothesis 2. Contrary to our expectations under Hypothesis 3, 
the impact of welfare performance perceptions at the peak of the crisis is lower 
than its effect before and at a later stage of the crisis. In the Portuguese case the 
effect is not even significant in 2012.
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Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance 
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Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance 
(2014)  
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Now, to what extent is the effect of satisfaction with welfare performance 
on political trust influenced by citizens’ levels of cognitive mobilization? To 
answer this question we performed a second set of regression analyses in which 
an interaction term between welfare performance and cognitive mobilization 
was added to the models. Results are presented in the Appendixes A and B. 
Overall our previous results obtain confirmation as to the significant role 
of cultural and institutional variables on trust. Regarding the interaction 
term, the effects are more significant for Spain (especially in 2014) than they 
are for Portugal. This suggests that for Portuguese citizens the impact of 
their evaluations of welfare performance on political trust is comparatively 
less affected by how much interest they have in politics and the amount of 
information they consume. To better clarify these effects we calculated the 
adjusted predictions for the interaction term. In 2008 the interaction is not 
significant in either country; looking at Spain, the effect of satisfaction with 
welfare performance on political trust is very similar for those with higher and 
lower levels of cognitive mobilization. In Portugal the interaction coefficient 
is also nonsignificant, but an interesting pattern, which would disconfirm 
Hypothesis 4, is observable: the effect of welfare performance on trust is 
hardly visible for those with no cognitive mobilization; otherwise, this effect 
would be positive among those more informed and interested in politics. 
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A similar trend – i. e. nonsignificant effects – is observed in 2012, but the 
pattern observed for Portugal in 2008 is no longer present (Figures 11.5 and 
11.6).
Finally, in 2014 the interaction term for Spain is significant. There are 
striking differences between those with no interest in politics or exposure to 
political news and those that, on the contrary, are very interested and exposed 
to the political world: while the latter progressively gain confidence in political 
institutions as they are more satisfied with welfare performance (with predicted 
values of trust rising from 1.7 to 3.5), the former follow a downward trend 
(Figure 11.7). Hypothesis 4 is therefore  disconfirmed. Instead, in Portugal 
the two groups follow a similar trend, although more cognitively mobilized 
individuals tend to accord more trust to political institutions. Differences 
between the two groups stop being significant when the highest levels of 
satisfaction with welfare performance (that is, >7) are reached.
Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance and 
cognitive mobilization (2008)  
Note: Adjusted Predictions with 90% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean. No mobilization = no 
exposure to news on politics and public affairs in the media and no interest at all in politics, High mobilization = 
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Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance and 
cognitive mobilization (2014)
Note: Adjusted Predictions with 90% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean. No mobilization = no 
exposure to news on politics and public affairs in the media and no interest at all in politics, High mobilization = 
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Adjusted predictions of political trust as a function of welfare performance and 
cognitive mobilization (2012)  
Note: Adjusted Predictions with 90% CIs. All other variables are centred at their mean. No mobilization = no 
exposure to news on politics and public affairs in the media and no interest at all in politics, High mobilization = 
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conclusion
Citizens’ trust in political institutions is often seen as a barometer of democratic 
health. The last decade has witnessed a widespread skepticism and distrust in 
political institutions, particularly affecting representative political institutions 
and politicians in European democracies. This chapter sought to identify the 
sources of political (dis)trust in two countries that were profoundly affected 
by the Euro Zone crisis. Our main arguments were twofold. Firstly, that levels 
of trust were strongly influenced by citizens’ interactions and experiences with 
welfare institutions such as the education and healthcare systems. This matters 
because it is on the basis of these experiences (perceived as good, bad, fair, 
and unfair etc.) that citizens base their assessments of political institutions. 
Moreover, since in both countries there had been important reforms in 
welfare systems, especially during the crisis, it was likely that this could bear 
negatively on citizens’ levels of political (dis)trust. The second argument was 
that this effect would be weaker for those more cognitively mobilized. To test 
these arguments, we performed regression analyses before (in 2008), during 
(in 2012), and after the peak of the economic crisis (2014) using ess data for 
Portugal and Spain.
The results gave support to most of our expectations and confirmed 
the main explanatory accounts in the literature (cultural and institutional 
explanations). A first set of results confirmed that there is a causal link between 
satisfaction with welfare performance and political trust: the higher the level 
of satisfaction with how health and education systems performed, the higher 
the level of trust. This was more evident in the case of Spain and also at the 
start (2008) and after the crisis peak (in 2014). In fact, in 2012, which we used 
as benchmark for the peak of the crisis, satisfaction with welfare performance 
had lighter (Spain) or no significant effect on political trust (Portugal). A 
possible explanation for the differences between Portugal and Spain might 
have to do with the extent to which the Portuguese citizens – more than the 
Spanish – were more prone to hold the European Union – rather the national 
executive – responsible for the crisis. This might have shielded representative 
political institutions from harsher appraisals of their performance during 
the crisis. The fact that welfare performance assessments mattered less at the 
peak of the crisis suggests that other competing/control variables, such as 
satisfaction with the economy and with the government, played a larger role 
in shaping citizens’ perceptions.
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A second set of results disconfirmed our expectation that welfare 
performance would matter less for the more cognitively mobilized individuals 
in terms of shaping their levels of trust. The only instance in which there is a 
significant moderating effect of cognitive mobilization was in Spain in 2014, 
and the trend is opposite to our hypothesis: indeed, the impact of welfare 
performance assessment was stronger for those more cognitively mobilized. 
Therefore, it seems that if and when interest in politics and exposure to political 
information had an impact on the explanatory power of welfare assessments 
on political trust, this impact is positive, reinforcing and strengthening the ties 
between  outcomes and trust. Additional research, namely focused on what it 
meant to be strongly exposed to political information during these years in 
Portugal and Spain (in terms of salience and framing of welfare issues), might 
shed additional light on this finding.
____________________________________
edalina rodrigues sanches
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa














290 citizenship in crisis
Appendix 11.A
Determinants of political trust in Portugal: the effects of welfare performance 
and cognitive mobilization 
 2008 2012 2014
Welfare performance -0.05(0.18) -0.01(0.12) 0.25(0.11)*
Cognitive mobilization 
2 -0.64(0.84) 0.10(0.58) 1.19(0.53)*
3 -0.39(0.85) 0.94(0.59) 1.42(0.56)*
4 0.03(0.94) 0.51(0.62) 1.80(0.56)**
Welfare performance * Cognitive mobilization
2 0.25(0.18) 0.10(0.12) -0.11(0.12)
3 0.28(0.18) -0.01(0.12) -0.04(0.12)
4 0.24(0.20) 0.05(0.13) -0.08(0.12)
Interpersonal trust 0.07(0.02)** 0.11(0.02)*** 0.06(0.03)*
Satisfaction with the economy 0.34(0.03)*** 0.44(0.03)*** 0.33(0.03)***
Satisfaction with the government 0.02(0.01)** 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.01)*
Reducing differences in income levels -0.07(0.07) -0.06(0.07) -0.11(0.07)
Age 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Gender (male) -0.07(0.11) -0.22(0.10)* -0.29(0.12)*
Years of education 0.01(0.02) 0.00(0.01) 0.05(0.02)**
Income 0.15(0.03)*** 0.09(0.03)** -0.02(0.03)
Occupation (Paid work) -0.15(0.13) -0.15(0.12) -0.28(0.13)*
Radicalism 0.07(0.05) -0.03(0.04) 0.04(0.03)
_cons 0.79(0.92) -0.03(0.68) -0.45(0.64)
Number of observations 933 972 983
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.32
Adj R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.30
Note: significant at +p<0.1*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Appendix 11.B
Determinants of political trust in Spain: the effects of welfare performance and 
cognitive mobilization 
 2008 2012 2014
Welfare performance 0.35(0.12)** 0.11(0.09) -0.09(0.11)
Cognitive mobilization 
2 -0.10(0.13) 0.03(0.09) 0.30(0.12)*
3 -0.06(0.13) 0.08(0.09) 0.33(0.12)**
4 -0.04(0.15) 0.13(0.10) 0.38(0.12)**
Welfare performance * Cognitive mobilization
2 -0.10(0.13) 0.03(0.09) 0.30(0.12)*
3 -0.06(0.13) 0.08(0.09) 0.33(0.12)**
4 -0.04(0.15) 0.13(0.10) 0.38(0.12)**
Interpersonal trust 0.19(0.02)*** 0.12(0.02)*** 0.14(0.02)***
Satisfaction with the economy 0.33(0.02)*** 0.39(0.03)*** 0.30(0.02)***
Satisfaction with the government 0.00(0.00) 0.02(0.01)** 0.02(0.01)***
Reducing differences in income levels -0.01(0.05) -0.12(0.05)* -0.10(0.05)+
Age 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Gender (male) -0.24(0.09)** -0.18(0.09)* 0.04(0.10)
Years of education 0.00(0.01) 0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.01)
Income 0.03(0.02) 0.01(0.02) -0.03(0.02)
Occupation (Paid work) 0.05(0.11) -0.19(0.10)* -0.40(0.11)***
Radicalism 0.11(0.03)** 0.06(0.03)* 0.01(0.03)
_cons -1.40(0.78)+ 0.11(0.49) 0.84(0.63)
Number of observations 1534 1452 1382
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.32
Adj R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.31
Note: significant at +p<0.1*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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